## \*\*Fiat Elitism

#### First, Our understanding of politics can inspire compassion.

PORTER, head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, 6 (Elisabeth, "Can politics practice compassion?" Hypatia Sep, p project muse)

As individuals, we have responsibilities beyond our personal connections to assist whenever it is within our capacities and resources to do so. I do not want to give the impression that our entire lives should be devoted to attending to others' needs. To do so would return women to exclusive nurturance at the expense of self-development and public citizenship. It is, rather, a matter of acting with compassion when it [End Page 108] is possible to do so, and the possibility of course is debatable and requires priorities, which differ with us all. Politically, this means that politicians, nations, and international organizations have a similar responsibility to alleviate the suffering that results when peoples' basic needs are not met. There is a heavy responsibility on wealthy nations where the extent of poverty and misery is not as conspicuous as elsewhere to assist less wealthy nations.16 State responsibility is acute when suffering is caused by harsh economic policies, careless sales of arms and military weapons, severe immigration rules, and obscene responses to terrorism by further acts of violence. With the majority of these massive global issues, most of us can only demonstrate the first stage of co-suffering, and perhaps move to the second and debate the merit of options that might meet peoples' needs, and alleviate suffering. This vocal civic debate can provoke the third process of political responses that actually lead to political compassion. Given nations' moral failures of compassion and such conspicuous evidence of oppression, exploitation, brutality, and indifference, we need to be observant, and understand the implications of a failure to practice compassion.

#### And, this argument is true in the specific context of policy debate.

GREENE, Pf Rhetoric at Minnesota, 05

(Ronald, Cultural Studies, Volume 19, Issue 1 January, pages 100 – 126)

Nearly forty years after the debating-both-sides controversy erupted in the mid 1950s, Star Muir (1993) defended the 'game' of debate on a new moral terrain. Muir would do so not on the ground of Day's reconstructed public ethic of free and full expression but on the internal terrain of a student's moral and cognitive development. For Muir, one need not fear speaking in a way divorced from the sincerity principle because the argumentative demands of tournament debate promoted the moral development suggested by Kohlberg and his allies in moral education. Debating both sides promoted moral development because it produced the necessary respect for a plurality of voices without being seduced by a moral relativism. Muir writes, 'cognitive development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles'. Moral development requires a respect for pluralism and universal ethical principles and, according to Muir, debating both sides, as a 'tool of moral pedagogy' promotes tolerance, pluralism and a means for acquiring universal norms. In other words, having students voice an argument different from their own conviction distances students from their own ego-centrism and instils them with a sympathetic attachment to the viewpoint of the other. In this way, debating both sides promotes dialogical and dialectical forms of reasoning educating the student away from his/her tendency to reason 'egocentrically and sociocentrically' (p. 287). Muir concludes his argument this way: '[M] oral education is not a guaranteed formula for rectitude, but the central tendencies of switch side debating are in line with convictions built on empathic appreciation for alternative points of view … in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for expression, the truth that emerges is more defensible and more justifiable' (p. 292). For Muir, debate retains its epistemic value while also taking on a new role in the moral development of students. At the same time, like Day, debating both sides performs internally on the mind and soul of the student. In the language of moral development, Day's defence of free and full expression circulates as a universal norm to guide the interaction between concrete interlocutors. For Muir, Day's defence is curiously absent, but it is important to note how Muir reassigns conviction to the process of generating morally sound judgments. According to Muir, the game of debate is redeemed on the terrain of moral development because it gives students the distance from acting on their arguments, helping to secure the possibility of respecting pluralism without risking moral relativism.

#### fiat doesn’t destroy agency – we are all stronger than that. Stop downplaying your agency.

#### Debate is not conformity. The constraints that we establish teach us to use context and structures to enable creativity. We should use debate rules as a way to practice “dancing in chains” and learning that disruption of structure is more subversive that departure from norm.

Hateb, Prof. Philosophy at Old Dominion University, in ‘2

[Lawrence J., “Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24, pg. 132-147]

It is a mistake, however, to read Nietzsche in simple terms as being against institutions and the rule of law on behalf of self-creation. First of all, even Nietzsche's early celebration of the Dionysian should not be taken as an anti- or extra-political gesture. In BT 21, Nietzsche insists that the Apollonian has coequal status with the Dionysian, and the former is specifically connected with the political order, which is needed to temper the Dionysian impulse toward "ecstatic brooding" and "orgiastic self-annihilation." Those who read Nietzsche as resisting "normalization" and "discipline" (this includes most postmodern readings and Appel's as well 13 ), are not on very firm ground either. For one thing, Nietzschean creative freedom is selective and most people should be ruled by normative orders, because universal unrestricted freedom would cause havoc. 14 Moreover, even selective creative freedom is not an abandonment of order and constraint. Creativity breaks free of existing structures, but only to establish new ones. Shaping new forms requires formative powers prepared by disciplined skills and activated by refined instruments of production. Accordingly, creativity is a kind of "dancing in chains" (WS 140). 15 Creative freedom, then, is not an abandonment of constraint, but a disruption of structure that still needs structure to prepare and execute departures from the norm.

#### Saying NO to catastrophe has value regardless of inevitability—

Barash and Lipton, 1985

David P., Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington (Seattle) and Judith Eve, psychiatrist at the Swedish Medical Center in Washington, “The Caveman and the Bomb” p.261-267

Fortunately, whatever genetic imperatives operate in Homo sapiens, they are unlikely to extend directly to nuclear weapons, any more than a tendency for body adornment necessarily leads to a Christian Dior necktie or a New Guinea penis sheath. The general patterns that char­acterize today's nuclear Neanderthal are, in fact, general, nonspecific. They may incline us to a degree of saber rattling that seems likely to trouble the world in one way or another as long as we and the world persist, but these patterns don't require that the saber be nuclear. On this level the nuclear Neanderthal doesn't even have to play "as if": We are called on to behave not as if we had free will regarding the renun­ciation of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, but to act in accord with that free will, which we assuredly have. That is honest empowerment indeed. Teilhard de Chardin wrote about the "Omega point" at which human beings become conscious of their own evolution and, hence, of them­selves. He called for a recognition of unity and connectedness, with our speciesborn on this planet and spread over its entire surface, coming gradually to form around its earthly matrix a single, major organic unity, enclosed upon itself; a single, hypercomplex, hyperconcentrated, hyperconscious arch-molecule, coextensive with the heavenly body on which it is born.9 In overcoming the Neanderthal mentality we could finally become hu­man, or perhaps even more than this, at last able to answer affirmatively the question: Is there intelligent life on earth? As poet and novelist Nikos Kazantzakis pleaded, "Let us unite, let us hold each other tightly, let us merge our hearts, let us create for Earth a brain and a heart, let us give a human meaning to the superhuman struggle."'° Something has spoken to me in the night, burning the tapers of the waning year; something has spoken in the night, and told me I shall die, I know not where. Saying: "To lose the earth you know, for greater knowing; to lose the life you have, for greater life; to leave the friends you loved, for greater loving; to find a land more kind than home, more large than earth—Whereupon the pillars of this earth are founded, toward which the conscience of the world is tending—a wind is rising and the rivers flow." THOMAS WOLFE 11 For the existentialists the essence of humanity is in saying no—no to injustice, to murder, to the absurd and dehumanizing universe itself But the ultimate existential tragedy is that in the long run, saying no cannot succeed. Each of us will eventually die, and this looming inevitability makes our lives absurd. By our very aliveness we are therefore embarked on a hopeless campaign, which may yield some victories, but only tem­porary ones. Like a cosmic poker game, we are playing against the house, but in this game the house never loses; even if we are briefly ahead, we cannot cash in our chips and go home winners. There is no other place to go. At the close of The Plague, Albert Camus lets us inside the thoughts of Dr. Rieux, who had courageously battled a typhoid epidemic in a North African city. Just as the plague has finally been overcome, and the survivors were celebrating in the streets, Dr. Rieux understood that the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never-ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers. And, indeed, as he listened to the cries of joy rising from the town, Rieux remembered that such joy is always imperiled. He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.12 But effectiveness per se is not the issue. The rats may come again, and with them the plague, just as every person now alive must some day die. The real question—for would-be post-Neanderthals no less than for existential thinkers—concerns the obligation of human beings in the face of such a world. "In everlasting terms—those of eternity," wrote Thomas Wolfe, "there is no greater wisdom than the wisdom of Ecclesiastes, no acceptance finally so true as the stern fatalism of the rock. Man was born to live, to suffer, and to die, and what befalls him is a tragic lot. There is no denying this in the final end." Nonetheless, he concludes, we must "deny it all along the way." Although admitting the "stern lesson of acceptance," which calls for acknowledging the "tragic under-weft of life into which man is born, through which he must live, out of which he must die," Wolfe described his intention, "having accepted it, to try to do what was before me, what I could do, with all my might."13 Camus went farther. According to Greek mythology, Sisyphus had been condemned to spend eternity rolling an enormous rock up a steep hill; when the rock neared the top, it would roll back down, and Sisyphus would have to start again. In "The Myth of Sisyphus," Sisyphus serves not only as a metaphor for humanity but, as Camus sees it, as a model as well. His struggle is not only self-defining, but also ennobling. More­over, Camus concludes that Sisyphus is happy. There are some important differences between Sisyphus and Dr. Rieux, and the post-Neanderthal. For one thing, Dr. Rieux could afford to lose many battles and even many patients, just as Sisyphus can tolerate the constant victory of gravity. Sisyphus, after all, is crushed neither mentally nor literally by his stone; no matter how many people die from a plague, some survive. Dr. Rieux will never eradicate the plague; his glory comes from his fighting on in the face of that knowledge. Sisyphus will never succeed in his labor; his happiness comes from his self-defi­nition, knowing his futility. Unlike them, however, we are not doomed to failure. Before beginning their combat the Roman gladiators used to face the spectators in the Coliseum and announce, "We who are about to die salute you." Two thousand years later the poet W. H. Auden updated their credo: "We who are about to die demand a miracle." Like the gladiators, Auden was concerned about the end of his life, what Kurt Vonnegut calls "plain old death." And to overcome plain old personal death, nothing less than a bona fide miracle in the theological sense will do. We can say no to personal death and an absurd universe all we like, but in the end, like Rieux and Sisyphus, we are bound to lose. The good news, however, is that the other kind of death—the mass, meaningless annihilation that would come with nuclear war—is not inevitable. Unlike the overturning of personal death, no divine intervention is required. Unlike the eruption of a volcano or the brewing of a hurricane, nuclear war is a man-made problem, with man- and woman-made solutions. Unlike Auden and the gladiators, we have a precious and unique op­portunity: We can say no to our Neanderthal mentality, to our genes. We are the only creatures on earth who can do this. We have this op­portunity because our genes whisper to us, they do not shout. They can be stubborn, but they can be persuaded, cajoled, bribed, or, if necessary, simply overruled and strong-armed into submission. Dr. Rieux learned in a time of pestilence that "there are more things to admire in men than to despise." Similarly, the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts, if we choose to be. We can be greater than the sum of our genes. If that is our decision, evolution can't do a thing about it. Making that decision is the supreme test of our humanity, our greatest challenge and our most sublime opportunity. Nonetheless, war touches a deep chord in most human beings, and the decision to say no will not be an easy one. Sigmund Freud com­mented that prohibitions and taboos by their very existence strongly suggest a preexisting desire to perform the prohibited act, otherwise there would be no need for the prohibition: "What no human soul desires, there is no need to prohibit; it is automatically excluded. The very em­phasis of the commandment Thou Shalt Not Kill makes it certain that we spring from an endless ancestry of murderers, with whom the lust for killing was in the blood, as possibly it is to this day with ourselves." He also emphasized that wars occur because nations, like individuals, "still obey their immediate passions far more readily than their inter­ests,"14 a succinct summary of the plight of today's Neanderthal. Prior to World War I especially, the making of war was generally considered a laudable activity. Admiration and often adulation flowed to such men as Alexander, Achilles, Caesar, Charlemagne, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Robert E. Lee. The first masterpiece of Western literature (Homer's Iliad) and the first histories (Herodotus' account of the Persian Wars, and Thucydides' study of the Peloponnesian War) focused on war. Western culture is by no means unique in its glorification of war, as witness the cultures of ancient Africa, Mexico, and Fiji. Ac­cordingly, "the war against war," as William James pointed out, "is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party."15 The fact is that war and sanctified violence have had a powerful and persistent appeal cross‑culturally, although not in all cultures, and throughout human history. Thus, as James said, war has come to be seen as "preserving our ideals of hardihood," a supreme test of human effectiveness, the most de­manding and, hence, for many people, the most rewarding activity of which they are capable. It is revealing that whereas "war" exists in the plural, "peace" is conceived only in the singular. (A similar pattern obtains in other lan­guages as well.) We have the War of the Roses, the Napoleonic wars, the Maori wars, World Wars I and II, and so on, but only one peace, despite the fact that there must have been as many different kinds of peace as different kinds of wars. As with the Eskimos, who are said to have eleven words for what in English we simply call "snow," or the Bedouin, who have more than one hundred words for "camel," human beings distin­guish carefully among whatever is important to them. For countless generations the human Neanderthal has been obsessed with war, and indifferent to peace, even slightly bored with it. When and if peace becomes as appealing as war, perhaps then we shall focus on it, identi­fying its varieties and nuances. Words signifying normalcy, like "peace," "health," and "sanity," have lagged behind their pathological counter­parts; thus, we know more about diseases than about wellness. Yet, as the holistic health movements are demonstrating, in order to practice preventive medicine, it is necessary to define, describe, and validate the state of wellness before one can act effectively to preserve it. Much of war's appeal, according to William James, comes from its aura of extremis, embodying the most dangerous and strenuous of human struggles, and hence becoming strangely ennobling despite (or in part, because of) its extraordinary horror. The contemplation of war, the prep­aration for war, and in many cases even the fighting of war is something that most Neanderthals find compelling, exciting, and even fun. Accord­ing to James, this gut-level attraction "cannot be met effectively by mere counter-insistency on war's expensiveness and horror. The horror makes the thrill; and when the question is of getting the extremist and supremist out of human nature, talk of expense sounds ignominious." He therefore proposed a "substitute for war's disciplinary function"—his now-famous Moral Equivalent of War, suggesting a peacetime conscription which would not so much overcome the Neanderthal mentality as bypass it with a bit of social ju jitsu, sublimating dangerous human urges into constructive activity.16 In a sense, the Peace Corps was a practical example of James's con­ception; but a real peace corps can be fashioned only when peacemaking becomes recognized as an acceptable and active verb, and when peace takes its rightful place at our own core. Ironically, in a world society that is increasingly intolerant of personal violence, that forbids murder, assault, even the threat of physical abuse, and in which fistfights and even bullying are grossly out of place, in diplomatic parlors, war and the threat of war remain acceptable. Rather than finding a moral equivalent of war, we have collectively made war itself into a morally acceptable form of violence such that societies can contemplate and plan actions that would be unacceptable if undertaken by its individual members. Those old Neanderthal cravings are still alive and well, running just beneath the surface, needing only the slightest provocation to erupt, even in the most sophisticated and presumably civilized societies. Just let some Americans be taken hostage in Iran, or a Korean airliner violate Soviet airspace, and suddenly the cavemen are at it again and the old predictable tribal bellowing resumes. Homo, called sapiens, is all but drowned in an atavistic avalanche of anger, distrust, and intolerance. The structures of peace, built up with such care and needing such nurturance, seem woefully delicate and fragile before the crude, easily evoked Neanderthal onslaught. But here we note Theodore Roethke's observation, "In a dark time, the eye begins to see." Perhaps by thinking, feeling, and believing, we can see through our Neanderthal mentality, and forge a new awareness where we confront our limitations and our strengths, able to bend, but nonetheless to resist and not to break. A major impediment to this awareness has been our ignorance that the Neanderthal mentality even exists. There is also the double irony of pessimism—the assumption that the Neanderthal mentality, under the alias of "human nature," is un­changeable. Insofar as it succeeds, this assumption is a triumph for the Neanderthal mentality and, moreover, a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is also seductive; it leaves each of us free to go ahead with his or her own little life, all the while treading on unstable slopes, heedless of the danger. "The challenge to humans in our time is whether they can become aroused not just over small but over larger dangers," observed Norman Cousins. "Whether they can perceive universal problems as well as per­sonal ones, whether they can become as concerned over their survival as a species as they are over their jobs."" This arousal is growing, in part because the overriding universal problem is increasingly perceived as an intensely personal one, because it threatens the deepest personal values of every human being, and also because it demands a committed personal response. Perhaps we shall have the final laugh after all, and perhaps the laugh will be on evolution. In giving so much autonomy to the bodies they create, the genes of Homo sapiens have unwittingly sewn the seeds of their own overthrow (not the seeds of their destruction, for that would mean our own demise as well). It is precisely—and only—by overthrowing our genes, by taking the unprecedented step and saying no to their dangerous and insistent whisperings, that we can preserve them, along with everything else. By saying no to that aspect of our genes, we say yes to life, to love, and to hope, and even to the continuation of those troublesome genes themselves. There is no better time. "At this moment," wrote Albert Camus, when each of us must fit an arrow to his bow and enter the lists anew, to reconquer, within history and in spite of it, that which he owns already, the thin yield of his fields, the brief love of this earth, at this moment when at last a man is born, it is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies. The bow bends; the wood complains. At the moment of supreme tension, there will leap into flight an unswerving arrow, a shaft that is inflexible and free.18 Maybe in the long run we shall all laugh together, as through our negation of the Neanderthal mentality we arrive at a new affirmation, a higher level of life, its most exalted accomplishment. This will be the point at which, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to universal murder, we resolve to overcome the Neanderthal mentality and thereby transcend, if not overcome, our biology itself.

#### Their criticism of spectatorship is reactionary - it produces a false dichotomy between duped spectators and political actors, ignoring that we are all spectators and that spectatorship is a form of action

Ramos et al, 2009 (Manuel, University of London, Costica Bradatan, Texas Tech, and Fabienne Collignon, University of Glasgow, “We Are All Spectators,” review of Jacques Ranciere’s “Emancipated spectator,” Parallax, vol. 15, no. 3)

Spectatorship constitutes the new focus in Jacques Ranciere’s continuous interrogation of the ground that supports our understanding of the efficacy of the arts ‘to change something in the world we live in’ (p.29). In Le spectateur e´mancipe´1 he calls into question the recurrent production of pitiable spectators in the Western critical tradition and its contemporary mutations. The book is particularly engaging in its fierce stance against practices of intellectual paternalism in art and philosophy. Ranciere repeatedly portrays numerous authors as pathologists who presuppose that the spectacle ‘weakens the heads of the children of the people’ (p.52), or that too many images ‘soften the brains of the multitude’ (p.105). The emphasis on the pseudo-medical veneer of cultural expertise stresses that what is at stake in this book is not a mere affair of intellectual condescension but the complete incapacitation of the spectators. The five conference papers composing this volume effectively dismantle the all too often characterization of the spectator as a malade of passivity and ignorance in order to vehemently affirm that spectatorship is a capacity of all and anyone. An heir of Foucault, Ranciere builds an expeditious genealogy that associates the work of disparate authors whose common premise is the spectator’s idiocy. The resonance of this genealogy of stultification is amplified by the re-activation of Ranciere’s investigation of pedagogical relations in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1987). This pivotal book in Ranciere’s re-conceptualization of emancipation examined the practice of Joseph Jacotot, who at the beginning of the nineteenth century developed a pedagogy not aimed at the instruction of the people but their emancipation. Jacotot refused to accept the instruction model because it repeatedly produces a hierarchical distance between the teacher and the student; instead he developed a methodology based on the equality of all intelligences. The parallelism Ranciere draws between Jacotot’s conclusions and the case of the spectator persistently galvanizes the anti-mastery brio of this book. But rather than a parallelism, Ranciere recognizes the very same process of stultification at work in the ways various philosophers and cultural revolutionaries indoctrinated and continue to indoctrinate the spectator. Ranciere, with undisciplined ardour, identifies the hierarchical distance between actors and spectators with a historical consensus produced by the work of stultifying pedagogues from Plato to Nicolas Bourriaud. If the instruction of the spectator dates back to Plato, it seems reasonable for Ranciere to declare it is high time to situate spectatorship on different grounds (p.54). However, Ranciere is chiefly concerned here with the current version of the instructional consensus and with what he recognizes as its particularly powerful stultifying effects. Post-critical thought (chapter 2) and different practices calling for a re-politicization of the arts (chapters 3 and 4) continue to entertain today a paternalistic relation with spectatorship. Ranciere regards this malaise as evidence of the persistence of the modernist model of critique and its determination to restore to health the ‘fragile brains of the people’ (p.54). But he also introduces a discontinuity between modernity and our present, and this difference is the key to understand the urgent pathos of these pages. Authors from the modern critical tradition such as Bertolt Brecht or Guy Debord got it wrong, and yet their horizon was the emancipation of the spectator. Since the winter, as Fe´ lix Guattari called the 1980s, the consensus to overturn the modernist paradigm disconnected the critique of capitalist spectatorship from any process of emancipation. Ranciere is vociferous against the disenchanted and apocalyptic subtraction of capability operated by what he calls ‘leftist melancholia’ (p.43). Theories of notorious authors such as Jean Baudrillard or Peter Sloterdijk are disgraced without ceremony as ‘tools against any process or even any dream of emancipation’ (p.38). In this sense, post-critical consensus has redoubled the incapacity of the spectators: we are not only seduced into passivity and ignorance by the capitalist spectacle but our experiments and desires are doomed to end up ‘swallowed in the belly of the monster’ (p.40). Le spectateur e´mancipe´ argues that to verify the capacity of art to resist the voracity of consensus it is crucial to re-conceptualize the political efficacy of spectatorship. Political art most often regulates the agency of the spectator according to the hierarchical opposition of doing and looking. The current will to re-politicize the arts is not an exception; its modus operandi is footed on the hierarchy between ‘active intelligence’ and ‘material passivity’ (p.69). Ranciere perceives a ‘strange schizophrenia’ in contemporary art: artists denounce the impasses of critique and post-critique and yet they continue to massively validate their consensual rationale of political action (p.57). The two usual suspects are targeted in this book: the critique of representation and the ethical immediacy between art and life. Both models are genealogically reconstructed as pedagogies of efficacy presupposing that spectators are ignorant of what they are really looking at and/or they are passive because they are only looking at. For Ranciere the current mobilization of concepts such as participation or community most often confirms the distribution of capacities and incapacities between actors and spectators. Different art practices, relational and other, seek to directly produce social relations in order to erase the distance between the spectator and the real world. Ranciere rightly insists that there is no evil distance that needs to be abolished between the spectator and the reality of political action. Ranciere, always ready to remove the act of looking an image from ‘the trial atmosphere it is so often immersed in’ (p.104), affirms spectatorship as an action that intervenes to confirm or modify the consensual order. Pedagogies of action are not only fallacious; for Ranciere to produce one model of efficacy is always a critical error. In Le spectateur e´mancipe´ political efficacy is constructed as an incalculable relation between the spectators and a political subjectivation. There is no model to be founded on the activation of spectatorship because, quite simply, we are all spectators. With unfussy statements such as ‘spectatorship is our normal situation’ (p.23), rather than through meticulous argumentation, Ranciere displaces the omnipotent logic of instruction inherent to countless edifying pedagogies to postulate spectatorship as a condition of all. Following his usual production of vacant names, Ranciere evacuates any specificity from the term spectatorship to problematize its capacity to designate one identifiable audience. The name-without-a-specific-content spectator becomes an operator performing in different configurations the gap between an identification and anonymity. Thus spectators become in these pages alternatively readers, viewers or consumers, but also poets, authors, translators. From the film La socie´te´ du spectacle to the photographs of Sophie Ristelhueber, from the documentary films of Rithy Panh to Madame Bovary, from the installation The Sound of Silence by Alfredo Jaar to media images, the book gathers contrasting voices across disciplinary boundaries to attest to the emancipation of the spectators. This indisciplinarity is not a virtuoso amplification of the scope of the book; it works to stage different theatrical manoeuvres to address different stakes of our spectatorship. Each chapter is best understood as a singular intervention pursuing the implications of the axiom we are all spectators for a re-conceptualization of critical art and in particular for the relation actor/spectator. The emancipated spectator of the title is not celebrated in this book as an active creator. In contrast to an author like Michel de Certeau who rejoiced in productive everyday tactics (‘the ways of operating of the weak’2), Ranciere understands the transformation of the consumer into a producer as a validation of the dominant hierarchy between action and passivity. In the chapter entitled ‘The Misadventures of Critical Thinking’ Ranciere points out that strategies of reversal like de Certeau’s continue to thrive among the critical intelligentsia and continue to be useless. Thus he understands the photographs of Josephine Meckseper or the work of Bernard Stiegler as the futile propositions from an up-to-date ‘inverted activism’ (p.42).3 The emancipation at stake in this book is not about turning the passive spectator into an active participant. It is about constructing another ground of efficacy through the disarticulation of the order equating the actor with activity, living reality, self-possession and the spectator with passivity, illusion and alienation. For Ranciere this hierarchical order is untenable because actors are always and already immersed in spectatorship. Actors and spectators actively engage with images and words through a ‘poetic work of translation’ (p.16). The distance between the actor, the spectator and the spectacle is not the evidence of a process of alienation but ‘the pathway that endlessly abolishes any fixation and hierarchy of positions’ (p.17). With welcomed polemical impetus Ranciere transforms the evil litany of interpretation, representation and mediation into a series of crucial components in the process of our emancipation as spectators. Spectatorship is thus constructed as a common, active, anonymous distancing that allows different re-distributions of capacities and incapacities between proper and improper bodies. Le spectateur e´mancipe´ re-formulates the critical capacity of numerous films, photographs and texts to verify that they produce effects inasmuch as they do not tell us what to do. Ranciere performs himself this anti-authoritarian stance with a conflictive equilibrium between a doctrinal style of writing and the declaration that the equalitarian ground of his oeuvre is a ‘foolish assumption’ (p.54). But the engagement against postures of mastery in these pages does not simply resonate in an anarchist vacuum that negates the hierarchy between authors and moronic spectators, readers or consumers. Very differently the cinema of Pedro Costa or a photograph by Walker Evans are interpreted as the ‘work of a spectator addressed to other spectators’ (p.91). Ranciere advocates a critical art that disqualifies its instructional authority and confirms an anonymous capacity of all to re-organize the set of distances and proximities of a consensual order. Spectatorship is re-worked as the cultural counterpart of the empty name people, i.e. an anonymous we that ruins any definitive formula to regulate cause and effects between art and political efficacy. The insistence on the un-decidability of the relation between spectators and a specific political subjectivation is not a sophisticated allegory of the state of the world or a cunning strategy of suspension. It works as an affirmative call to the readers of these pages to re-distribute again the grounds from where we read, write or look.

## Gift

### 2ac normal

#### Our framework is that debate praxis should focus and be evaluated based on the outcomes of action rather than the process– that’s key to fairness- infinite assumptions in the 1AC mean we should get to weigh the aff as offense- key to plan focus and decisionmaking skills

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies.

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### Permutation do both- the aff gives people a choice

### 2AC – Alt Fails

#### Baudrillard cannot access any form of political change and sees all forms of violence as inevitable. His only alternative is death.

Wolin, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, in ‘4 [Richard, “The Seduction of Unreason”, pg. 305-6]

For all Baudrillard’s predictability, there is no denying that, on occasion, he expresses a clever formulation or witty insight. But, ultimately, how seriously should we take a social philosopher who recommends that his books be treated like science fiction novels or Borgesesque ficciones? Very much so, insofar as Baudrillard’s cliché- ridden view of American society has become standard issue among academic postmodernists. Like his precursors on the European right, Baudrillard believes that human actors are powerless to implement meaningful social change. The die has been cast. “Hyperrealilty”—the reign of the “simulacrum”—confronts us as an ineluctable fate, an inexorable, postmodern condition humaine. The amor fati celebrated by Germany’s conservative revolutionaries has been updated and recycled, only to reemerge as one of the commonplaces of ivory tower radical chic. Yet as Baudrillard’s critics have observed, his peculiar combination of epistemological skepticism and political nihilism accord with “a postmodern mood of widespread cynical acquiescence,” resulting in a form of theory that is “ill-equipped to mount any kind of effective critical resist- ance.”59 There is no point in trying to combat today’s “captains of consciousness,” since all criticism and contestation end up recycled by the culture industry’s vast semio-technological maw. In the epitome of postmodern political fatalism, the only strat- egy Baudrillard has to recommend is “death”: solely by aping the information society’s own lifelessness and inertia—a practice he refers to as “crystal revenge”—does one stand a chance, argues Baudrillard, of escaping its enervating clutches.60 Thus, according to Baudrillard, the implosions of media society portend the collapse of the emancipatory project in general. His verdict on the impossi- bility of progressive historical change reiterates one of the com- monplaces of reactionary rhetoric: the so-called futility thesis, according to which attempts to transform society are condemned a priori to failure.61 The nihilistic implications of Baudrillard’s approach have been confirmed by the unmitigated schadenfreude with which he responded to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In his view the assault represented a justified response to the challenge of American global hegemony. Although terrorist groups based in the Middle East may have been nominally responsible for executing the attacks, in truth it was an act that fulfilled the longings and aspirations of people all over the world. As Baudrillard observes, “haven’t we dreamt of this event, hasn’t the entire world, without exception, dreamt of it; no one could not dream of the destruction of a power that had become hegemonic to such a point. . . . In essence, it was [the terrorists] who committed the deed, but it is we who wished for it.”62

### AT Disaster Porn

#### Turn: violence is inescapable. Our violence enables understanding more than it inhibits. Remembering and representing violence is essential to avert the destruction of the other. Reject the critique’s silence.

Michael Eskin, Research Fellow and Lecturer, European Literature, Cambridge University, Dialectical Anthropology, 24: 407-450, 1999, p. 391-6

Derrida allows nothing prior to language; since, in Derrida's s philosophy, everything is inscribed in language, he places speech and language prior to ethics, prior to any possible ethical injunction. Derrida's formulations owe a tremendous debt to several major epistemological shifts. of the early twentieth century: Sapir's and Whorf's notion that language conditions thought, for example, or Lacan's claims that both conscious and unconscious thought processes (and thus the subject) are structured by language. Because for Derrida ethics is inscribed, along with everything else, in language, and because for Derrida language is inherently violent in that it is always a reduction, a totalization, he reaches the conclusion that even a Levinasian ethics cannot ever avoid violence: "One never escapes the economy of war." The origin of this violence inherent in discourse is the act of inscribing the other in the definitions and terms of the same: Predication is the first violence. Since the verb to be and the predicative act are implied in every other verb, and in every common noun, nonviolent language, in the last analysis, would be a language of pure invocation . . .purified of all rhetoric [in Levinas' terms] . . . . Is a language free from all rhetoric possible? Derrida answers his own question in the negative, affirming that "there is no phrase which is indeterminate, that is, which does not pass through the violence of the concept. Violence appears with articulation." Foucault has expressed this same sentiment, maintaining that "We must conceive discourse as a violence we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we impose upon them." Naming and predication‑two acts essential to language‑confine what is being described, and fix it in one's own terms. As we shall see from an examination of Hiroshima non amour, memory works the same way, attempting to enclose the past within determinate parameters, employing the same brand of totalization to whose presence in language Derrida has gestured. Concern over the necessary violence of memory as representation to the consciousness, as willed inscription in one's own terms of what is other because past, is perhaps the most obvious point at which Derrida, Levinas, Duras, and Resnais converge, for the impossibility of remembering an historical event as it was‑of actually arriving at a clear understanding of a past event by imaging it through memory, by re‑presenting it to our memory‑is a chronic preoccupation of Hiroshima mon amour. Resnais confronted this dilemma as well in the process of constructing Nuit et brouillard. Claiming historical authority over Auschwitz, or giving the illusion that it is comprehensible, would only, in Resnais' opinion, "humaniz[e] the incomprehensible terror," thereby "diminishing it," perhaps even romanticizing it; so, unable to describe the violence, and unwilling to inscribe it, Resnais opted instead to document our memory of it. Resnais carries no illusions that the past can be duplicated to any significant degree, rendered for us now as it was then. Given the accepted generic constraints of a film, he says, "it is absolutely absurd to think that in that space of time one can properly present the historical reality of such a complex event. [Historical facts] were the bases for our `fiction,' points of departure rather than ends in themselves." This explains what Leo Bersani has described as Resnais' clear favoring of the word "imagination" over the word "memory" when referring to his own films." However, in the case of Hiroshima mon amour, instead of filling in with imagination the details between the historical "facts," the film throws its hands up at any effort to "remember" or "see" the tragedy at Hiroshima. Thus, Hiroshima mon amour, in the words of one critic, turns out "to be a film about the impossibility of making a documentary about Hiroshima"1' or, in Armes' more broadly epistemologically oriented phrase, "a documentary on the impossibility of comprehending." Duras reminds us of this in her synopsis of the screenplay: "Impossible de parler de HIROSHIMA. Tout ce qu'on peut faire c'est de parler de l'impossibilite de parler de HIROSHIMA (Impossible to speak of HIROSHIMA. All one can do is speak of the impossibility of speaking of HIROSHIMA)." She then drives the point home in Hiroshima mon amour's unforgettable opening sequence, as Okada incessantly reminds Riva that she can never know Hiroshima's tragedy. Riva knows, for example, that there were two hundred thousand dead and eighty thousand wounded, in nine seconds; she can rattle off the names of every flower that bloomed at ground zero two weeks after the bombing; she has been to the museum four times, seen the pictures, watched the films. As if to accentuate the veracity of' Riva's learned data, Duras alerts the reader in a footnote to the origin of the details, and there is hardly a more famous or traditionally reputable source on the immediate aftermath of the bombing than John Mersey's Hiroshima. And yet, as one critic has commented, "les images collees aux murs . . . sont incapables de faire revivre completement la realite du fait (images pasted to walls . . . are incapabale of completely restoring the reality of the fact)." Despite Riva's wealth of statistical (read: historically trustworthy) data, Okada is able to refute her with confidence, "Tu n'as rien vu a Hiroshima (You saw nothing at Hiroshima)," and the almost incantatory repetition of this phrase strengthens its punch. Duras increases the effect by reminding us that the day of the bombing of Hiroshima, while a tragedy for Okada, coincides with Riva's liberation from her horrifying wartime experience in Nevers, France. This fact forces the question: How can Riva ever understand as a tragedy an event that corresponded with her own emotional rebirth and reclaiming of some measure of normalcy? The effect is even stronger on what Duras must have assumed would be a predominantly Western audience, when Okada points out that the entire world was celebrating while Hiroshima smouldered in ashes. This fact forces another, similar question, one that I myself must confront on reading or watching Hiroshima mon amour: How could the Westerners in the audience ever expect to grasp the tragedy that they originally celebrated as the end of the war? These reminders have their own Verfremdungseffekt further alienating the audience/reader from the history of Hiroshima, dispelling any lingering notion that historical tragedy can ever be fully comprehended. Riva's optimism is almost infectious, though, and she indeed believes that she can master the history behind the leveling of Hiroshima. She claims to know everything, and she is once again swiftly negated by the Japanese. She contents herself by concluding that, even if she does not know yet, “ca s'apprend (one learns)."" She is not gifted with memory, though, as Okada reminds her and thus all she can claim to know about Hiroshima is what she has "invente." This particular verbal exchange is highlighted by the fact that it is for the first time in the text Riva's turn to use the word "rien," until this point a word uttered frequently and only by Okada: ELLS: Je n'ai rien invente. (SHE: I invented nothing.) LUI: Tu as tout invente. (HE: You invented everything.) Proof of her inability to approach comprehension of Hiroshima arrives in the form of a laugh, when Riva asks her lover if he was at Hiroshima the day of the bombing and he laughs as one would laugh at a child. She shows herself further distanced from the historical event by the manner in which she sounds out the name of the city, "Hi‑ro‑shi‑ma," as if it were‑or rather because it is‑radically foreign to her. (Later, in the same manner, Okada sounds out Riva's youth, the story of which will always be unknown and incomprehensible to him: "Jeune‑a‑Ne‑vers [ Young‑in‑Nevers].") Her memory of Hiroshima, created by herself and inscribed in terms that she can understand from photographs taken by other people, is mere "illusion," truth several times removed. She remembers, though, and almost obsessively, because she knows that it is worse to forget. Historical memory must be reductive, sometimes violently so, according to a Derridean understanding of it, because it is always a form of representation and thus of predication. A less diplomatic statement made by Okada goes so far as to suggest that one's memory only ever serves one's own purposes: "Est‑ce que to avais remarque," he asks, "que c'est toujours dans le meme sens que l'on remarque les chows? (Did you ever notice that one always notices things in the same way?)." We notice what suits us, in the direction and sense which we prefer, and we notice it in the manner in which we can best use it. However, just as language‑the system of representation par excellence‑carries in its every use the violence inherent in its reductiveness, we use it anyway, as it enables far more than inhibits. In Levinas's formulation, not only is discourse our primary means of relating to and maintaining the other, but the absence of it, silence, "is the inverse of language . . . a laughter that seeks to destroy language. " Derrida accords with Levinas: "denying discourse" is "the worst violence," "the violence of the night which precedes or represses discourse." Despite the violence that Riva's impulse toward memory commits against any ideal or "objective" history, absolute forgetting is far more dangerous; by any account, remembering and representing past violence must be seen as a necessary evil, as a sort of metaphysically violent means of averting future real, physical violence. Still, the partial forgetting of the unforgettable tragedy is inevitable, as John Ward points out in his treatment of Resnais' films: "With the passage of time we become so insensitive to other people's suffering that we can lie in the disused ovens of Auschwitz and have our photographs taken as souvenirs." Duras' text also renders disturbing images of forgetting, of loubli. Riva confesses to her own struggle against ignorance: "mei aussi, j'ai essaye de lutter de toutes mes forces contre l'oubli . . . . Comme toi, j'ai oublie (me too, I've tried to struggle with all my strength against forgetting . . . . Like you, I've forgotten). "During the third part of Duras' script, at the staged demonstration against nuclear armaments, Okada seems far too preoccupied with taking Riva back to his family's house to care about the demonstration, even if it is only a performance for a film. Immediately after explaining the appearance of the charred skin of Hiroshima's surviving children, he informs her, "Tu vas venir avec moi encore une fois (You will come with me once again)." Remembering the bombing is quite obviously not a first priority for him. There are other grim reminders of the forgetting in the reconstruction of Hiroshima and the importation of American culture. At one point, Riva and Okada enter a nightclub called "Casablanca" ‑a strange immortalization of American pop culture in a city leveled by an American bomb less than two decades earlier. Moreover, the Japanese man who tries to converse with Riva in the Casablanca gladly (and proudly, it seems) speaks the language of the conquerors, the bomb‑droppers. The attitude on display in this scene is reminiscent of one in John Hersey's account of the months following the bombing, in Hiroshima: [Dr. Fujiil bought [the vacant clinic] at once, moved there, and hung out a sign inscribed in English, in honor of the conquerors: M. MUJII, M.D. MEDICAL & VENEREAL Quite recovered from his wounds, he soon built up a strong practice, and he was delighted, in the evenings, to receive members of the occupying forces, on whom he lavished whiskey and practiced English. While there is certainly something to be said for not bearing a grudge, the speed of the forgetting and forgiving seems unbelievable. Memory represents historical tragedy insufficiently, in violently subjective reductions; we are never able to experience being there and can never know the event, can never have witnessed it firsthand. Thus, we forget. Duras' script clearly stresses both the necessity and difficulty of remembering, but demonstrates, perhaps pessimistically, that we will veer slightly but inexorably toward l'oubli. And once we forget, violence will erupt again.

### 2AC - Perm

#### Perm – plan and

#### Our methods are not mutually exclusively, they are complimentary – public policy methods and critical theory can inform one another to create defiant and reflexive consumers of information – this is critical to actualizing their critique of simulation

Ozane 95 (JULIE L. OZANNE Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg JEFF B.MURRAY University of Arkansas - ’95 Uniting Critical Theory and Public Policy to Create the Reflexively Defiant Consumer, AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 38 No. 4, February 1995 516-525)

In a postmodern society, people maneuver through an information-rich environment in which their relationships with other people are increasingly being mediated by forces such as television, VCRs, computers, and information highways. This hyperreality creates new cultural spaces that shape our understanding of ourselves and our environment, and may require different adaptive skills (Kincheloe & McLaren, 1994). The marketplace is one example of the changing cultural spaces that we face. The explosion of information technology means that the late-20th-century consumer can shop from their televisions, scan their bank checking cards at grocery stores, and order merchandise at home using their computers. As consumers make choices in this mediascape, information technology facilitates the tracking, recording, and storing of information about their behavior at unprecedented levels. What are the implications of this new marketplace^—and how should consumers respond in face of these new cultural forms? A more insurgent consumer may be needed to challenge and contest the role of the postmodern marketplace in fulfilling and defining their needs. The purpose of this article is to suggest a point of convergence between critical theory and public policy. This convergence suggests a different type of consumer, one that is empowered to reflect on his or her social conditions to decide how to live. This decision may result in informed participation in the consumer culture, the reflexive defiance of this lifestyle, or a creative combination of these two strategies. Critical theory is the term that is often used to describe the work of the group of researchers who coalesced around the Frankfurt Institute beginning in the early 1920s (Held, 1980). The early theorists, who included Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal, Herbert Marcuse, and Friedrich Pollack, wanted to use interdisciplinary approaches to study the link between the individual and society. Contemporary social theorists have extended and revitalized the ideas of the Frankfurt School. These extensions make critical theory relevant to a postmodern marketplace that is characterized by an explosion of information and increasingly abstract symbolism. For example, Habermas expresses the emancipatory interest in terms of a theory of communication; Baudrillard takes the Frankfurt School's theory of one-dimensional society to a higher level by using the semiologi-cal theory of the sign to describe the world of commodities (Kellner, 1989). These theorists seek to systematically critique society to help people envision new forms of social organization (Adorno, 1973; Baudrillard, 1981; Habermas, 1971; Horkheimer, 1972; Jay, 1973). Thus both critical theorists and public policy analysts share the common goal of trying to improve the quality of people's lives that are shaped by social structures such as laws and public policy (Forester, 1985b; Murray & Ozanne, 1991). Although critical theory and public policy both emphasize theory-directed social change in the public interest, their research traditions have stressed different parts of this theory-practice equation. Public policy research generally emphasizes the practice side of this equations (e.g., studying the impact of deregulation on marketing and consumer welfare, changing perspectives at the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, consumption of alcohol and cigarettes, advertising practices, consumer education, etc.). Critical theorists, on the other hand, emphasize the theory side of this equation. These researchers live in an abstract world of ideas such as materialism (as a proposed solution to Cartesian interactive dualism), immanent critique (as a proposed solution to problems associated with foundationalism), functional ethical relativism, dialectics, ideal speech situations . . . (Murray & Ozanne, 1991). Because the two traditions emphasize different elements of the same theory-practice equation, or what the critical theorists would refer to as praxis, they each have something to offer the other. For example, critical theory's longstanding commitment to creating forms of social organization that make possible freedom, justice, and reason could usefully guide the making of public policy. Similarly, the policy analysts' focus on concrete policies could help with critical theory's ongoing struggle to translate theory into meaningful action (Forester, 1985b).

### 2AC – Pessimism Turn

#### The alt is overly pessimistic and inadvertently sustains the status quo

Noys, 2k7 (Benjamin, Lecturer in English at The University of Chichester, “Crimes of the Near Future: Baudrillard / Ballard” Ballardian March 21, http://www.ballardian.com/crimes-of-the-near-future-baudrillard-ballard)

In the terminology of Alain Badiou, we might locate Baudrillard as part of the dissident tradition of ‘anti-philosophy’ (see Hallward, 2003: 20-23). According to Badiou this ‘tradition’ poses an ineffable transcendent meaning against philosophy, and often does so in fragmentary anti-systematic forms. Although he does not deign to mention Baudrillard his list of anti-philosophers includes most of the figures mentioned above. Identifying unequivocally with philosophy, in a new rationalist form, Badiou argues that the fundamental orientation of anti-philosophy is theological. Lurking behind the transcendent meaning or figure of radical alterity is God. From this point of view Baudrillard’s ‘criminal thought’ would be another attenuated religiosity, searching for an ever-receding mystical intuition of the ‘Object’. Now Baudrillard himself, in Simulacra and Simulation, realised the danger of the ‘anti-’position of simply being opposed to an existing form or discourse (1994: 19). In precisely the terms I have been discussing the ‘anti-’ position is one of simulated alterity, by means of which dead forms sustain themselves. Instead of destroying what it opposes, the pose of opposition supports and sustains it. The irony is that Baudrillard and Ballard’s invocation of the extreme crime might all too easily sustain the system of simulation they are subjecting to hypercriticism. Rather than out-bidding and accelerating simulated alterity the danger is providing a new form of simulated alterity. They are both transfixed by the possibility of a truly authentic criminal act always just out of reach. This is made even more ironic by the media fascination with ‘true crime’ – from CCTV footage of criminal acts to the fascinated horror of accounts of the activities of serial killers. Therefore I am suggesting that Baudrillard’s ‘criminal and inhumane kind of thought’ is not criminal and inhumane enough. Isn’t the problem that this criticism simply leaves us in the position, so often made by critics of Baudrillard, of an absolute pessimism in the face of inescapable systems? ‘Criminal thought’ is a failure and so we have no escape from the reign of simulated alterity, other than a quite literal faith in the Other.

#### The Alternative is not radical—but is part of a self-sustaining cycle of transgression which is infinitely regressive and ultimately gets coopted by the system

Noys, 2k7 (Benjamin, Lecturer in English at The University of Chichester, “Crimes of the Near Future: Baudrillard / Ballard” Ballardian March 21, http://www.ballardian.com/crimes-of-the-near-future-baudrillard-ballard)

As Baudrillard puts it ‘You want us to consume – O.K., let’s consume always more, and anything whatsoever; for any useless and absurd purpose’ (1983: 46). Let’s take the previous example I used of new extreme horror films. They seem to incarnate a logic of simulated alterity and invite either horrified disgust or perverse celebration, both operations of giving meaning to them. What about those spectators who take the films precisely as it often seem they are intended, as a game? The game is ‘what have you got to show me?’, ‘how far will you go?’, but rather than a perverse logic of escalation or desensitisation, it is a matter of indifference. Instead of searching for an alterity that would push beyond the screen, or even the viral return of the alterity, say in forms of mimicking of the violence shown, we simply have a passive response to it as a game. There is no alterity here, but only play. One of the so-called ‘video nasties’ of the 1970s, Wes Craven’s Last House on the Left (1972), had the tagline ‘To avoid fainting, keep repeating “It’s only a movie … It’s only a movie…”‘. The playful assumption of the tagline is that the audience will identify so much with what they are watching that they will be overcome unless they remind themselves that they are only watching a film. This sense of identification with the film has also been a common assumption in film theory, especially in its psychoanalytic forms [1]. However, what if the audience does not have to keep repeating ‘it’s only a movie’ to avoid fainting? What if they recognise this simulated alterity as what it is and hyperconform to it? They play a game with the film by not treating it as real, but at the same time conforming to its effects of horror. This does not involve a simple fascination with finding an authentic transgressive excess but rather a blank passivity. In some senses it might be suggested that the increasingly extremity of recent horror films responds to this audience inertia; as this over-involvement absorbs simulated alterity the filmmakers must ‘up the stakes’, only to encounter another level of inertia. Certainly these are my own highly speculative suggestions, but I think they indicate something that Baudrillard’s own recent invocations of criminal thought and radical alterity step-back from in his own work. What is being avoided is banality in favour of the transgressive crime. This argument for the banality of the media and the hyperconformity of the masses to this banality has implications for our strategies of response that have not fully been exhausted. Within academia it is a familiar accusation that media studies is banal. In that most directly Baudrillardian of novels White Noise (1984) the character Murray, a lecturer on ‘living icons’, remarks ‘I understand music, I understand the movies, I even see how comic books can tell us things. But there are full professors in the place who read nothing but cereal boxes’; his friend replies ‘It’s the only avant-garde we’ve got’ (1999: 10). This exchange indicates something interesting, with a remark about the banality of the object being answered with the suggestion that this is our avant-garde. It identifies one of the key modes by which media studies has often justified itself: as an avant-garde political gesture. Therefore against the supposed banality of the object the media studies scholar replies by finding within that object, or more exactly in its use by the consumer, strategies of transgression or its synonyms (subversion, resistance, alterity, etc.). In this way the banality of the object is redeemed through its association with political or cultural transgression. At the same time the activity of the scholar is also redeemed from banality due to its political import, which is revealed by the superior insight of the critic. On the other side, that of cultural producers, the game of transgression is also played to elevate their own products to the status of transgressive objects. In this way academia and cultural producers position themselves with a self-confirming loop of transgression. The ‘criminal’ gesture of Baudrillard and Ballard could easily be regarded as simply a hyperbolic extension of this line of argument. They claim that although the kind of everyday transgressions identified by media scholars or practiced by cultural producers are part of the society of simulated alterity there is still a radical alterity beyond representation. This might appear to be a radical ‘out-bidding’ but it falls within the same ‘avant-garde’ logic, as well as drawing radical alterity back into representation. In a sense it retains a faith in a pure product of transgression in relation to which every actual gesture of transgression, whether critical or artistic, must necessarily fall short. The alternative I am suggesting is to reply to the critic of the banality of the media in the mode of hyperconformity: ‘You accuse the media of being banal? O.K. what I do as a critic or producer is banal, more banal and useless than you could ever know!’. The advantage of this hyperconformist response lies not simply in disarming the critic. It refuses to justify the media object in other terms (political or artistic, for example) and it refuses the frantic invocation of transgression. The account that Baudrillard and Ballard give of simulated alterity suggests that transgression is not actually transgressive; it is rather that transgression is boring. Although de Sade is often regarded as the original thinker of transgression he already came to this insight in his account of the final apathy of the libertine (see Klossowski, 1992: 28-34). To play the game of transgression is to fall within an unacknowledged banality, as well as to continue to sustain the dead forms of contemporary culture. Therefore it is a matter of pushing through and completing the banality of transgression. Of course this hyper-conformity can easily fall back into plain conformity, such as with the American artist Jeff Koons in his ‘Banality’ show of 1988. As he put it ‘[m]y work tries to present itself as the underdog. It takes a position that people must embrace everything’ (in Muthesius (ed.), 1992: 107). However, the withdrawal that I am tracing is not quiescent, but the refusal of the immediate equation of certain content with transgression and the refusal of the conformity of transgression itself. It is an attention to the politics of form. In particular it is an attention to that banality that Ballard accessed through science-fiction. As he stated in 1971:

### 2ac – suffering bad

#### Avoiding suffering is DISTINCT from fearing death—extreme anguish is NEVER justified because it’s imposed on others.

**Edelglass 6** – William, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marlboro College, “LEVINAS ON SUFFERING AND COMPASSION” Sophia, Vol. 45, No. 2, October 2006

Because suffering is a pure passivity, lived as the breach of the totality we constitute through intending acts, Levinas argues, **even suffering that is chosen** cannot be meaningfully systematized within a coherent whole. Suffering is a rupture and disturbance of meaning because it **suffocates the subject and destroys the capacity for systematically assimilating the world**. 9 Pain isolates itself in consciousness, overwhelming consciousness with its insistence. Suffering, then, is an absurdity, 'an absurdity breaking out on the ground of signification.'1~ This absurdity is the eidetic character of suffering Levinas seeks to draw out in his phenomenology. Suffering often appears justified, from the biological need for sensibility to pain, to the various ways in which suffering is employed in character formation, the concerns of practical life, a community's desire for justice, and the needs of the state. Implicit in Levinas's texts is the insistence that the analysis of these sufferings calls for a distinction between the use of pain as a tool, a practice performed on the Other's body for a particular end, and the acknowledgement of the Other's lived pain. A consequence of Levinas's phenomenology is the idea that instrumental justifications of extreme suffering necessarily are insensible to the unbearable pain theyseek to legitimize. Strictly speaking, then, suffering is meaningless and cannot be comprehended or justified by rational argument. Meaningless, and therefore unjustifiable, Levinas insists, suffering is evil. Suffering, according to Levinas's phenomenology, is an exception to the subject's mastery of being; in suffering the subject endures the overwhelming of freedom by alterity. The will that revels in the autonomous grasping of the world, in suffering finds itself grasped by the world. The in-itself of the will loses its capacity to exert itself and submits to the will of what is beyond its grasp. Contrary to Heidegger, it is not the anxiety before my own death which threatens the will and the self. For, Levinas argues, death, announced in suffering, is in a future always beyond the present. Instead of death, it is the pure passivity of suffering that menaces the freedom of the will. The will endures pain 'as a tyranny,' the work of a 'You,' a malicious other who perpetrates violence (TI239). This tyranny, Levinas argues, 'is more radical than sin, for it threatens the will in its very structure as a will, in its dignity as origin and identity' (TI237). Because **suffering is unjustifiable**, it is a tyranny breaking open my world of totality and meaning 'for nothing.' The gratuitous and extreme suffering that destroys the capacity for flourishing human activity is generally addressed by thinkers in European traditions in the context of metaphysical questions of evil (is evil a positive substance or deviation from the Good?), or problems of philosophical anthropology (is evil chosen or is it a result of ignorance?). For these traditions it is evil, not suffering, that is the great scandal, for they consider suffering to be evil only when it is both severe and unjustified. II But for Levinas suffering is essentially without meaning and thus cannot be legitimized; **all suffering is evil**. As he subsumes the question of death into the problem of pain, 12 so also Levinas understands evil in the context of the unassumability and meaninglessness of suffering. 13 The suffering of singular beings is not incidental to an evil characterized primarily by the subordination of the categorical imperative to self-interest, or by neglect of the commands of a Divine Being. Indeed, for Levinas, evil is understood through suffering: 'All evil relates back to suffering' (US92). No explanation can redeem the suffering of the other and thereby remove its evil while leaving the tyranny of a pain that overwhelms subjectivity.

### 2ac – totalitarian turn

**The alternative displaces the rationalization and concern for humanity through its hostility towards politics --- this opens up the space for unimaginable totalitarian horrors**

**Biskowski 95** Lawrence J, Professor of political theory and political economy at the University of Georgia, Politics versus Aesthetics: Arendt's Critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, The Review of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 59-89

Arendt consistently maintained that the entire philosophical tradition, from Plato through Heidegger and including Nietzsche, was "not of this world,"84 and thus **hostile** to and **dangerous** for politics. Whatever aspects of that tradition which may have ended with Nietzsche and Heidegger, the basically unworldly nature of its orientation to politics-as epitomized by the essentially **solitary philosopher searching for knowledge** about human affairs while withdrawing from them-survived. Arendt appreciated Nietzsche and Heidegger as thinkers and philosophers, and she certainly understood the relevance of key elements of their phi- losophies, such as the debunking of the tradition's metaphysical notions of Truth, for politics. But neither understood sufficiently the **distinctive elements of politics**. In view of these criticisms, it seems rather difficult to imagine Arendt as particularly sanguine about contemporary postmodern or aestheticized approaches to self and politics. She would al- most certainly launch a similar critique of the contemporary turn toward aestheticism. The pervasive and deadening effects of bureaucracy and instrumental forms of reason have produced a peculiar kind of overreaction. The latter-day aestheticians of poli- tics turn from one essentially unworldly principle to the next, and seek to make politics understandable via that principle. Jurgen Habermas makes a similar point: "To instrumental rea- son, they juxtapose in manichean fashion a principle only acces- sible through evocation, be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being or the dionysiac force of the poetical."85 From the point of view of Arendtian politics, aestheticization merely replaces or- more likely-temporarily **displaces rationalization**,86 while creating a host of **new dangers**, mainly stemming from the **loss of the common, public world** as a source of orientation. As Arendt pointed out in her study of totalitarianism, [t]he ruthless individualism of romanticism never meant anything more serious than that "everybody is free to create for himself his own ideology." What was new in **Mussolini's experiment** was the "attempt to carry it out with all possible energy."87 Previous forms of intellectual aestheticism aggravated the **disorientation** which is so much a feature of modernity, and inadvertently **contributed to an atmosphere in which otherwise unimaginable horrors became possible.**8

## Presumption

#### Debate doesn’t kill agency

Hanghoj 08 http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

#### Data goes aff

**Eijkman 12 (**The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims\_in\_authentic\_learning\_report.pdf. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal)

¶ This is where simulations have come into their own. The operative word is ‘have’, as there is a substantive record of success, which will be shown below. The point is that simulations have demonstrated the capacity either singularly, or in combination with other learning methods, for dealing effectively with the learning demands posed by public policy development; and this is not just at post-graduate level in universities, but at the highest echelons of American military leaders and policymakers (see for example Brewer, 1984; Beriker & Druckman, 1996; Babus, Hodges & Kjonnerod, 1997; Andreozzi, 2002McCown, 2005 and attached reading list in Annexure 2.10). Policy development simulations are effective in meeting the learning needs of both early career and highly experienced practitioners. Simulations help them to deal more proficiently with a complex mix of highly adaptive, interdependent, and interactive socio-technical, political, and economic systems; their often uncertain systemic reactions; and their unpredictable unexpected and undesired effects (Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002; Jacobsen, & Wilensky, 2006; Bekebrede, 2010; van Bilsen, Bekerede & Mayer, 2010)

#### And we’re key to decision-making – talking about big impacts and making tough decisions on a big scale tests cost-benefit in its most extreme forms and makes it easier for us to make smaller decisions in our lives

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

#### Agency is biologically inevitable – any other definition of agency links to your offense

**Schlutsmeyer 05** Mark W. Candidate for the Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation Director: Larry M. Leitner, Ph.D “An Ecological Approach To Personal Construct Psychology” http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Schlutsmeyer%20Mark%20W.pdf?miami1122491629

The important point here is that at all times similarity and difference are both newly created in our relationship with the world. Right now, as I glance around this room and all of this “information” is hitting my eyes, an equally new creation is unfolding. Retinal cell configurations and cortical cell configurations are making patterns; patterns that literally are correspondences with (similarities to) that which preceded them in time. 12 But in the very same moment, the creation of these correspondences involves a totally new reorganization of the processes these cells are comprised of. The same is true of the changes/similarities that will then be created after the visual cortex has done its work (e.g., processes of memory storage, etc.). As a result, all of my perceptions, ideas, linguistic expressions, and dreams are always both similar to and different from other real processes that they relate to. Implications for Agency. I will use a slightly different example to stick with this same point and carry its implications further. I might think about a previous conversation with my spouse once now and once an hour from now. My construal of the conversation might be similar on both occasions; I may remember the same gestures and apparent attitudes that I observed as she and I spoke. I may employ similar constructs during both of my reflective moments. But the two moments of construal also will be necessarily different. An hour from now, when I think of the conversation, an entire hour’s worth of life will have transpired—an hour that will contribute to the way my construal process will be bringing up the conversation afresh. I might employ the same memories and constructs, but I can never employ them again in the exact same fashion. **This implies that human agency is inevitable**. An hour from now, my body will have to pull everything together all over again to reconstrue the conversation. That body and its “state of mind” will have changed by then and so is incapable of a complete replication of the old process. It will necessarily engage in a new process of organizing its neurons into new patterns that are both similar to and different from old ones—it cannot “know” the conversation with my spouse in any other way. This agentic and bodily reorganization is equally important in relations that appear to be more deterministic such as the guitar and retina example described above. The properties of the guitar and the lighting may seem to dictate precisely what image will form on the retina, and thus dictate what I perceive. But the body’s process is always a newly generated one—so how the body reorganizes during guitar/retina relations can never be predicted by the guitar alone. Neither can it be predicted by the retina alone. What we perceive cannot be attributed solely to the structure of the knower or the known. Neural patterns that organize as I look at the guitar are similar to and different from the 13 guitar itself and they are similar to and different from previous neural patterns and other bodily processes. In this sense, the new patterns that comprise the activity of knowing are an active infusion of “inner” and “outer” patterns. I would suggest that this ongoing process of infusion itself is agency. **Agency is not a process of making choices that are free from the constraints of external reality. It is a person’s continual melding of real processes that are both “external” and “internal” to the person**. If you were to ask me to choose a description of the moving tractors that I can see outside my window right now, I might say “there are tractors making changes in the road,” “there are several people earning a living,” “there is earth being torn to bits,” “there are machines about to bury my house,” or “there is a new road to heaven being created for me,” among other things. According to personal construct ontology, the arrangements of neurons underpinning all of these possible constructions are similar to and different from 1) the real activities that occur in a real world, and 2) previous constructions I have employed. In the activity of bringing these processes together a new construction is generated—a new hypothesis to be tested

#### No reason to vote neg- if anything vote aff because we cause a reflexivity if our policy

## 2ac – death cult

#### Fear and discussion of death are different – contemplating finitude exposes the purpose of life

**Gunaratna 82** Buddhist(V.F. “Buddhist Reflections on Death” http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/gunaratna/wheel102.html)

To the average man death is by no means a pleasant subject or talk for discussion. It is something dismal and oppressive — a veritable kill-joy, a fit topic for a funeral house only. The average man immersed as he is in the self, ever seeking after the pleasurable, ever pursuing that which excites and gratifies the senses, refuses to pause and ponder seriously that these very objects of pleasure and gratification will some day reach their end. If wise counsel does not prevail and urge the unthinking pleasure-seeking man to consider seriously that death can knock at his door also, it is only the shock of a bereavement under his own roof, the sudden and untimely death of a parent, wife or child that will rouse him up from his delirious round of sense-gratification and rudely awaken him to the hard facts of life. Then only will his eyes open, then only will he begin to ask himself why there is such a phenomenon as death. Why is it inevitable? Why are there these painful partings which rob life of its joys? To most of us, at some moment or another, the spectacle of death must have given rise to the deepest of thoughts and profoundest of questions. What is life worth, if able bodies that once performed great deeds now lie flat and cold, senseless and lifeless? What is life worth, if eyes that once sparkled with joy, eyes that once beamed with love are now closed forever, bereft of movement, bereft of life? Thoughts such as these are not to be repressed. It is just these inquiring thoughts, if wisely pursued, that will ultimately **unfold the potentialities inherent in the human mind to receive the highest truths.** According to the Buddhist way of thinking, death, far from being a subject to be shunned and avoided, is the key that **unlocks the seeming mystery of life**. It is by understanding death that we understand life; for death is part of the process of life in the larger sense. In another sense, life and death are two ends of the same process and if you understand one end of the process, you also understand the other end. Hence, by understanding the purpose of death we also understand the purpose of life. It is the contemplation of death, the intensive thought that it will some day come upon us, that softens the hardest of hearts, binds one to another with cords of love and compassion, and destroys the barriers of caste, creed and race among the peoples of this earth all of whom are subject to the common destiny of death. **Death is a great leveler**. Pride of birth, pride of position, pride of wealth, pride of power must give way to the all-consuming thought of inevitable death. It is this leveling aspect of death that made the poet say: "Scepter and crown Must tumble down And in the dust be equal made With the poor crooked scythe and spade." It is the contemplation of death that helps to destroy the infatuation of sense-pleasure. It is the contemplation of death that destroys vanity. It is the contemplation of death that gives balance and a healthy sense of proportion to our highly over-wrought minds with their misguided sense of values. It is the contemplation of death that gives strength and steadiness and direction to the erratic human mind, now wandering in one direction, now in another, without an aim, without a purpose. It is not for nothing that the Buddha has, in the very highest terms, commended to his disciples the practice of mindfulness regarding death. This is known as "marananussati bhavana." One who wants to practice it must at stated times, and also every now and then, revert to the thought maranam bhavissati — "death will take place." This contemplation of death is one of the classical meditation-subjects treated in the Visuddhi Magga which states that in order to obtain the fullest results, one should practice this meditation in the correct way, that is, with mindfulness (sati), with a sense of urgency (samvega) and with understanding (ñana). For example, suppose a young disciple fails to realize keenly that death can come upon him at any moment, and regards it as something that will occur in old age in the distant future; his contemplation of death will be lacking strength and clarity, so much so that it will run on lines which are not conducive to success. How great and useful is the contemplation of death can be seen from the following beneficial effects enumerated in the Visuddhi Magga: — "The disciple who devotes himself to this contemplation of death is always vigilant, takes no delight in any form of existence, gives up hankering after life, censures evil doing, is free from craving as regards the requisites of life, his perception of impermanence becomes established, he realizes the painful and soulless nature of existence and at the moment of death he is devoid of fear, and remains mindful and self-possessed. Finally, if in this present life he fails to attain to Nibbana, upon the dissolution of the body he is bound for a happy destiny." Thus it will be seen that mindfulness of death not only purifies and refines the mind but also **has the effect of robbing death of its fears and terrors,** and helps one at that solemn moment when he is gasping for his last breath, to face that situation with fortitude and calm. He is never unnerved at the thought of death but is always prepared for it. It is such a man that can truly exclaim, "O death, where is thy sting?" In the Anguttara Nikaya the Buddha has said, "Oh Monks, there are ten ideas, which if made to grow, made much of, are of great fruit, of great profit for plunging into Nibbana, for ending up in Nibbana." Of these ten, one is death. Contemplation on death and on other forms of sorrow such as old age, and disease, constitutes a convenient starting point for the long line of investigation and meditation that will ultimately lead to Reality. This is exactly what happened in the case of the Buddha. Was it not the sight of an old man followed by the sight of a sick man and thereafter the sight of a dead man that made Prince Siddhattha, living in the lap of luxury, to give up wife and child, home and the prospect of a kingdom, and to embark on a voyage of discovery of truth, a voyage that ended in the glory of Buddhahood and the bliss of Nibbana? The marked disinclination of the average man to advert to the problem of death, the distaste that arouses in him the desire to turn away from it whenever the subject is broached, are all due to the weakness of the human mind, sometimes occasioned by fear, sometimes by tanha or selfishness, but at all times supported by ignorance (avijja). The disinclination to understand death, is no different from the disinclination of a man to subject himself to a medical check-up although he feels that something is wrong with him. We must learn to value the necessity to face facts. Safety always lies in truth. The sooner we know our condition the safer are we, for we can then take the steps necessary for our betterment. The saying, "where ignorance is bliss it is folly to be wise" has no application here. To live with no thought of death is to live in a fool's paradise.

#### Not a voting issue – just a reason to reject death impacts, we still solve suffering and improve the living conditions of Mexican citizens

#### Evaluating death impacts teaches us how to make tougher decisions which is key to learning decision-making skills because it makes it easier to make smaller decisions in our lives – that’s key to using anything we learn correctly in the real world

#### Our interpretation of death is that it occurs when the body’s brain does not work anymore- it is back by scientific studies

**Not talking about these things doesn’t make it go away – it just causes anxiety and other problems because we have no way to deal with our emotions – turns their impacts**

Greenspan 3, Pioneer in the Area of Women’s Psychology, (Miriam, “An Excerpt from Healing through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair by Miriam Greenspan,” www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp\_5513.html)

While it would be comforting to think that all phobias and fears are irrational, obviously this is not the case. The threats to survival in our era are numerous. Global warming, environmental pollution, nuclear and biochemical disasters, and terrorism are not individual but global threats. But this doesn’t mean they don’t affect us as individuals! In relation to these threats, it has become almost impossible to experience fear in the old individualized way that we once did when being chased by a wild boar. Our fears are rational, rargely transpersonal, and overwhelming. They are also largely denied. In this unprecedented world context, fear is continually triggered and benumbed. Isolated in our own skins, without a community in which our fears can be shared, validated, and addressed, the authentic experience of fear in our time has become almost impossible. We can’t heal what we don’t feel. The alchemy of fear is out of reach until we can learn, like Jack, how to feel our fear. When we don’t know the contours of our fear, when we can’t experience it authentically or speak about it openly, we are more likely to be afflicted with anxieties and phobias, panic, obsessive-compulsion, psychosomatic ills, and all kinds of controlling, destructive, and violent behaviors. Those of us who don’t know how to feel our way through the real fears that haunt us; or who are not threatened by the immediate, in-your-face fears that plague millions of people on earth—fears of starvation, war, homelessness, disease, pervasive violence—have replaced the alarm of authentic fear with the host of “anxiety disorders” that have become epidemic in our time.

#### Our talk of death is not the same as what their authors criticize. It is a fearless fear done in the name of love, not political manipulation – this is key to prevent conflict

Wink 1 – Professor Emeritus of Biblical Interpretation at Auburn Theological Seminary (Walter, October 17, “Apocalypse Now?” Christian Century, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1058/is\_28\_118/ai\_79514992)

Positive apocalyptic, by contrast, calls on our every power to avert what seems inevitable. "Nothing can save us that is possible," the poet W. H. Auden intoned over the madness of the nuclear crisis; "we who must die demand a miracle." And the miracle we got came about because people like the physician Helen Caldicott refused to accept nuclear annihilation. But she did it by forcing her hearers to visualize the consequences of their inaction. Imagination, says Anders, is the sole organ capable of conveying a truth so overwhelming that we cannot take it in. Hence the bizarre imagery that always accompanies apocalyptic. Optimists want to believe that reason will save us. They want to prevent us from becoming really afraid. The anti-apocalyptist, on the contrary, insists that it is our capacity to fear which is too small and which does not correspond to the magnitude of the present danger. Therefore, says Anders, the anti-apocalyptist attempts to increase our capacity to fear. "Don't fear fear, have the courage to be frightened, and to frighten others too. Frighten thy neighbor as thyself." This is no ordinary fear, however; it is a fearless fear, since it dares at last to face the real magnitude of the danger. And it is a loving fear, since it embraces fear in order to save the generations to come. That is why everything the anti-apocalyptist says is said in order not to become true. If we do not stubbornly keep in mind how probable the disaster is and if we do not act accordingly, we will not be able to prevent the warnings from becoming true. There is nothing more frightening than to be right. And if some amongst you, paralyzed by the gloomy likelihood of the catastrophe, should already have lost their courage, they, too, still have the chance to prove their love of man by heeding the cynical maxim: "Let's go on working as though we had the right to hope. Our despair is none of our business."

#### Without a fear and discussion of death - states will dissolve leading to catastrophic wars

Beres 96, PhD at Princeton, (Louis Rene, “No Fear, No Trembling Israel, Death and the Meaning of Anxiety,” www.freeman.org/m\_online/feb96/beresn.htm)

Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety." There is, of course, a distinctly ironic resonance to this argument. Anxiety, after all, is generally taken as a negative, as a liability that cripples rather than enhances life. But anxiety is not something we "have." It is something we (states and individuals) "are." It is true, to be sure, that anxiety, at the onset of psychosis, can lead individuals to experience literally the threat of self-dissolution, but this is, by definition, not a problem for states. Anxiety stems from the awareness that existence can actually be destroyed, that one can actually become nothing. An ontological characteristic, it has been commonly called Angst, a word related to anguish (which comes from the Latin angustus, "narrow," which in turn comes from angere, "to choke.") Herein lies the relevant idea of birth trauma as the prototype of all anxiety, as "pain in narrows" through the "choking" straits of birth. Kierkegaard identified anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom," adding: "Anxiety is the reality of freedom as a potentiality before this freedom has materialized." This brings us back to Israel. Both individuals and states may surrender freedom in the hope of ridding themselves of an unbearable anxiety. Regarding states, such surrender can lead to a rampant and delirious collectivism which stamps out all political opposition. It can also lead to a national self-delusion which augments enemy power and hastens catastrophic war. For the Jewish State, a lack of pertinent anxiety, of the positive aspect of Angst, has already led its people to what is likely an irreversible rendezvous with extinction.